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Book review: Mark Elliott, Jack Williams, and Alison L Young (eds), The UK Constitution After 
Miller: Brexit and Beyond (Hart 2018, 318pp, ISBN 978-1-50991-640-5). 
 
Eleni Frantziou (Durham) 
 
Whereas, in the EU law universe, one can think of several landmark rulings, focusing for the better part 
of 300 pages on a single case – as The UK Constitution After Miller does – is still an unusual task. The 
UK Supreme Court’s judgment in R (Miller) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2017] UKSC 5 nevertheless justifies that focus.  
 
Miller is a case of monumental importance for the UK constitution, marking the beginning of the end 
for a rich and, at least in my view, meaningful part of its constitutional history: that of EU membership. 
In Miller, the Supreme Court was asked to address not only the limits of executive action and the role 
of the Westminster Parliament in the UK constitution but, more broadly, issues such as the integration 
of EU law in the UK, the degree of choice allowed to the devolved territories about their EU 
membership, the legal value of constitutional conventions, the existence of hierarchically superior 
constitutional statutes including the European Communities Act 1972, and the fate of the acquired rights 
of individuals, to mention but a few. As such, while it is not an EU law case in the classical sense, Miller 
certainly is a case not only UK but also EU constitutional law students and scholars ought to read, both 
as a historic artefact of an unprecedented process of withdrawal from the European Union and as part 
of a broader discourse about the relationship between supranational law, state sovereignty, and 
individual rights – conversations which have been at the forefront of EU law for several decades. Aside 
from the significance of the ruling itself, the edited collection by Elliott, Williams, and Young also 
manages to sustain the reader’s interest. Through twelve carefully put together contributions by pre-
eminent figures in the UK constitutional landscape, The UK Constitution After Miller effectively tackles 
all different facets of the judgment. Of these, I particularly enjoyed reading more about the territorial 
aspects of Miller (McHarg, pp. 155-180 and Anthony, pp. 181-202). I also found David Howarth’s 
analysis of retrospectivity and the protection of rights a very measured and convincing critique of the 
case (pp. 131-154), highlighting the substantive inequalities Miller tacitly allowed to operate following 
a date in the 2019 calendar, which still remains abstract and changeable at the time of writing.  
 
Furthermore, the editors should be praised for seeking to offer a balanced perspective on Miller and for 
retaining a tight focus on the case, thus justifying the book’s title and avoiding the temporality of a 
general Brexit chat. There are, however, some aspects of the book that I would query. While the 
contributions are interesting and well-crafted, the technicalities of the case and especially questions 
around the separation of powers have already been extensively discussed. The book certainly offers 
some excellent debates about the UK constitution, including one between Mark Elliott (pp. 221-248) 
and Sir John Laws himself (pp. 203-220) on the merits of the divination of constitutional statutes in 
Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) – a case with which EU lawyers are 
certainly familiar. Yet, I did wonder whether even more space for cross-fertilisation and dialogue could 
have been found within the volume and, indeed, whether broadening it to include some non-legal 
perspectives might have boosted its appeal to the well-read audience on Brexit.  
 
More specifically, I thought it was unfortunate that the only contribution that grapples with Miller in its 
exceptional political context is the penultimate one, by Ekins and Gee (pp. 249 – 276). Ekins and Gee 
deplore the ruling for its technicality and for insisting upon wrongly construed legal authorities and not 
upon the political mandate of the 2016 referendum. For them, the ruling represents the ultimate 
expression of a constitution that rejects a ‘legitimate exercise in self-government’ (p. 250), thus 
succumbing to pressure by legal, academic, and judicial ‘elites’ – a term which they use no less than 
four times in their introduction alone. The Supreme Court ought to have seen Miller for what, in their 
view, it was: part of a ‘strategy that was seized on (and perhaps also concocted by) elites to delay or 
frustrate (or to delay in the hope of frustrating) the referendum result’ (p. 258). But, beyond a somewhat 
nostalgic defence of direct democracy and critique of other arguments as misunderstandings at best 
(see, especially pp. 259-264) or desperate manifestations of an ‘elite cry of rage’ at worst (p. 250ff.), 
what is it that the authors propose more positively – for instance, in respect of matters clearly ensuing 
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from the Miller litigation, such as respect for the rights of minorities? This was not clear to me from 
reading their contribution and yet it is a point on which the ruling’s consequences are most divisive. 
Could it not be argued that the reasoning in Miller was underwhelming in its textualism not because it 
is yet another instance of judicial expansion into the public sphere but, rather, because its near-absolute 
reaffirmation of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty reduces the moral qualities of representation 
by failing to offer adequate safeguards during the deployment of the Brexit mandate, such as the 
entrenchment of individual rights (whether these individuals form part of ‘elites’ or otherwise)?  
 
This is not the place to engage in detailed critique of a single contribution. In my view, though, the 
above controversy surrounding Miller was worthy of further, evidence-based analysis and exchange 
within the volume. In this regard, I thought that the stated focus of the book on ‘the reasoning in the 
judgment and its longer-term consequences’, as per its abstract, left something to be desired. After all, 
Miller is not predominantly a case about the debate between political or common law versions of UK 
constitutionalism; nor is it predominantly a case about constitutional statutes and constitutional 
conventions; it is not even, perhaps, just a case about the rights derived from EU law. As Ekins and Gee 
point out, Miller remains a largely context-specific case about Brexit, as a political decision that has 
thrown up all of the above tensions within the UK’s constitutional order and its relationship with the 
Union. I therefore felt that the book would have benefitted from a closer engagement both with political 
and with institutional theory, as means of understanding more deeply not only the Court’s decision, but 
also the merits of different versions of democratic governing and the responses the ruling received from 
other actors within the UK constitution, including Parliament.  
 
Still, having set out what is perhaps an opportunity for future academic study, I thought that the book 
was overall very valuable, in that it collects in one place much of the legal commentary on Miller and 
is thus likely to become a useful reference point on one’s bookshelf. It is also a book that offers a 
platform for different strands of UK constitutional discourse to be presented to a broader readership and 
will provoke reflection for anyone interested in the evolution of the UK constitutional settlement 
through Brexit and in the concerns about judicial power and popular authorship that characterise it. 
 
 
